This page was mutated from its original content to reduce and change some links that could confuse integrity.
This was an html rendering of an original raw plaintext email numbered 005124.
Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
jpp at markv.com
jpp at markv.com
Tue Jul 13 20:43:52 PDT 1993
- Previous message: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
- Next message: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
- Messages sorted by:
[ date ]
[ thread ]
[ subject ]
[ author ]
My concerns about two way authentication become clear when you
concider the LINK+sockets program a substitute for rsh, rexec, login
or similar programs. You don't want to be spoofed, and you don't want
others using your account.
When you are using LINK in the way it was originaly designed, you
more or less *have* authentication in both directions. From you to it
since discovering a private key given a public key is concidered
hard. From it to you since *presumably* the only user able to read
the key file on the shared machine is you.
The bootstrap problem (how you get the public key to the machine
with only unsecure chanels at your disposal) is interesting though. I
wonder if it can be solved without DH key exchange?
j'
- Previous message: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
- Next message: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
- Messages sorted by:
[ date ]
[ thread ]
[ subject ]
[ author ]
More information about the cypherpunks-legacy mailing list